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Comments and Casenotes
Free Speech And Prior Restraints
Kovach v. Maddux
Plaintiffs Kovach and Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. brought an
action against the speaker and sergeant-at-arms of the Tennessee State
Senate seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the State
Senate2 which forbade the plaintiffs' access to the press section of the
Senate floor until the publisher of the plaintiff newspaper agreed in
writing that his reporters would abide by the rules of the Senate.
Prior to this action the newspaper had been vehement in its criticism
of the use of secret sessions by the State Senate. The editor of the
newspaper, believing the secret sessions violated the right of the press
to cover the legislative process, had instructed his reporters to refuse
to leave the Senate floor when a secret session was called until asked
to leave by .the sergeant-at-arms. The plaintiff Kovach was a reporter.
Following his editor's instruction, he refused to leave the Senate floor
when a secret session was called. The sergeant-at-arms could not be
found and the Senate adjourned for 'the day. The following day, the
Senate adopted the above-mentioned resolution conditioning the en-
trance to the Senate floor of any members of the staff of the Nashville
Tennessean upon the editor's agreement that they would abide by
the Senate rules.
The District Court granted the injunction, basing its decision in
parts on the fact that the resolution was a prior restraint of the plain-
tiff's right -to collect and distribute news under the first amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, enforceable against the state
through the fourteenth amendment. The distinction was made by the
court that although the Senate could hold the plaintiff Kovach in
contempt for unproper actions, they could not restrain the newspaper's
right to criticize the Senate by coercing it to agree to "abide by" the
1. 238 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
2. Senate Resolution No. 9 reads as follows:
BF IT RESOLVED by the Senate of the State of Tennessee that all repre-
sentatives of the NASHVILLZ Th-NNESS tAN are hereby denied access to
the floor of the Senate for the remainder of the Session of the 84th
General Assembly as a result of the defiance by the representatives of
that publication on February 3, 1965 of the rules of the Senate and the
ruling of the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government in enforce-
ment of its orderly procedures.
This order will remain in effect until such time as the publisher of
the offending publication by letter informs the Clerk of the Senate that
the offending publication's representatives will henceforth abide by the
rules of this body.
Id. at 837.
3. The court also relied in part on the conclusion that the requirement of a
"serious, direct and immediate" threat to a legitimate state interest had not been met,
and on the fact that the Senate had failed to demonstrate that there was no alternative
to the resolution enacted.
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rules of the Senate. The court noted that "abide by" could well mean
acquiescence and acceptance. Pursuing this semantic possibility, the
court characterized the resolution as conditioning "the availability of
the conveniences and advantages of the press section of the Senate
floor upon the plaintiff newspaper pledging itself to a condition which
virtually requires it to surrender any opposition to Senate rules. . .. "'
Although the challenged restriction had been imposed solely upon
staff of the plaintiff's newspaper, the District Court did not explicitly
claim that the plaintiff newspaper was denied equal protection of the
law. Rather it seems to have wanted to reach the issue of whether a
legislative body can lawfully impose a prior restraint on the freedom
of the press as a means of enforcing its rules. Thus the case appears
to say that the legislature could not have imposed such a restraint even
by a statute applying equally to all newspapers and including adequate
procedural safeguards. The examination of the prior restraint cases
which follows will attempt to test this very broad statement of the
decision of the District Court.
There are three types of cases in which the prior restraint doc-
trine has been deemed relevant to the analysis of a problem involving
limitations on free speech. The first situation arises where the content
of the material suppressed 'is not relevant to the application of a statu-
tory restraint. The second type exists where an administrative official
has been granted a discretionary power over who may exercise certain
first amendment rights. In these cases the content may be made rele-
vant by the official's selective or discriminatory enforcement of a statute
or ordinance. In the last situation the content of the exercise of the
right is made specifically relevant by the language of the statute or
ordinance itself. In the cases where the content is relevant, no speech
is censorable prior to the act or punishable subsequent to the act unless
it creates a "clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil." 5
Anglo-American law, being especially wary of infringement on
the exercise of a legitimate freedom, has scrutinized the prior restraint
much more carefully than the subsequent punishment. Blackstone con-
sidered prior censorship the essence of state control of the press.0 The
Supreme 'Court came to the same conclusion in Near v. Minnesota,7
which is considered the landmark case on the subject.' The Court in
the Near case went so far as to say that the major purpose of the first
amendment was protection from previous restraints on publication. 9
4. Id. at 845.
5. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Generally, the Supreme Court
has said that subsequent punishments are only enforceable where the speech presents
a "clear and present danger" of producing action which the state has a valid interest
in preventing. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 41 (1919). A dis-
cussion of the "clear and present danger" test is not within the scope of this note.
For further investigation see Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger - From Schenck
to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313 (1952) ; Schmandt, The Clear and Present Danger
Doctrine, A Reappraisal in the Light of Dennis v. U.S., 1 ST. Louis U.L.J. 265 (1951).
6. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 151-52 (Lewis ed. 1922).
7. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648,
654 (1955).
9. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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The Court also attempted to outline the situations where expression
could properly be suppressed prior to public dissemination."0 These
were: (1) publication of matters concerning national security; (2)
obscenity; and (3) incitement to acts of violence which threaten the
security of community life."
However, the prior restraint doctrine of Near has often been
argued in cases not involving any of the types of restrictions enumer-
ated in Near but instead in cases challenging state or local statutes
limiting other types of activity.' 2 For example, the Supreme Court
has stated that a city or state may constitutionally limit the times and
places where first amendment rights are exercised, if the statute is
safeguarding the public order.13 In cases where the statute is so drawn
as to make the content of the freedom to be exercised irrelevant, the
court should merely weigh the value of the conflicting interests. In
respect of such a statute, the Court, in Saia v. New York,' 4 said:
"Courts must balance the various community interests in passing on
the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved here.
But in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of
the First Amendment in a preferred position."' 5
In weighing these factors the Court has on occasion decided that
the statute in question, although in effect limiting the exercise of a
first amendment freedom, was sufficiently restrictive in application as
to be a proper exercise of the state's or municipality's duty to safe-
guard the public order. 6 In Lovell v. City of Griffin,17 a city ordinance
which restricted the right to distribute circulars without a permit from
city officials was held unconstitutional. The avowed purpose of the
statute was to prevent the harrying of the local citizenry on the streets
and the littering of the streets."i The ordinance was not limited to
those things and places which the Court believed could have been
10. Id. at 716.
11. This attempted listing of fields in which prior restraints may be valid has been
called "not carefully considered and scarcely be said to have settled the issue." Emerson,
supra note 8, at 661.
12. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). A good review
of the cases dealing with licensing can be found in State v. Corbisiero, 67 N.J. Super.
170, 170 A.2d 74 (1961).
13. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) : "It is equally
clear that a State may by General and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the
times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings
thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of
the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment." See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938), where the
Court indicates that a state may have the right to restrain speech if the statute is
sufficiently limited in application and promotes a vital state interest.
14. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
15. Id. at 562.
16. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) ; Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). In Poulos the Court said, at page 405: "The ordi-
nance merely calls for the adjustment of the unrestrained exercise of religions with
the reasonable comfort and convenience of the whole city." Cox deals with a right
to parade.
17. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
18. See argument for the appellee, 303 U.S. 444, 445 (1938).
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properly regulated by the city. 9 The Court could have stopped here,
but instead went on to discuss the fact that the ordinance applied prior to
the act, and in part based its decision on the opinion in the Near case."
The fact that the court did proceed to discuss prior restraints was
not only unnecessary, but also misleading. The opinion would lead
one to believe that finding the restraint prior and not subsequent was
a necessary holding of the case. However, the fallability of such reason-
ing is indicated by the case of Schneider v. State,2 decided only one
year after the Lovell case. The Court in Schneider was faced with
four statutes. Three were criminal statutes which prohibited the dis-
tribution of handbills to the public and which applied sanctions subse-
quent to the violation.2" The other required the obtaining of a license
before such distribution could take place. 23 The Court held all four
unconstitutional. Regarding the first three, the Court balanced the
interest involved and said: "We are of opinion that the purpose to
keep -the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify
an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street
from handing literature to one willing to receive it."' 24 As to the fourth
ordinance, the court emphasized the priorness of the application of the
ordinance and held it to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.
When a court considers one of these non-content ordinances, it is
apparent that the primary question to be asked, especially in the light
of those cases finding some such ordinances applying prior to the act
constitutional and valid,2" is whether the state interest being protected
is substantial enough to allow the state to restrict certain actions, not
whether the restraint is prior or subsequent to the act. If not, then the
statute or ordinances should be invalidated without a discussion of
prior restraints. It would seem that the same reasoning utilized regard-
ing the validity of criminal ordinances could have been equally well
applied to the licensing statute. The Court could have concluded that
the state is not justified in punishing or licensing a person rightfully on
a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it.
In broaching the prior restraint element of the case, the Court
in Schneider was presented with a type of ordinance where the question
of the application of the prior restraint doctrine is a closer one, even
19. The Court said of the statute: "It is not limited to ways which might be
regarded as inconsistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving dis-
orderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of tile
streets." Id. at 451.
20. Id. at 451-52.
21. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
22. These ordinances were from Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Worcester, Massa-
chusetts. The Los Angeles ordinance provided: "No person shall distribute any hand-
bill to or among pedestrians along or upon any street, sidewalk or park, or to passen-
gers on any street car, or throw, place or attach any hand-bill in, to, or upon any
automobile or other vehicle." Id. at 154. The other two were very similar to the Los
Angeles ordinance. Id. at 155-56.
23. This ordinance was from Irvington, New Jersey and provided: "No person
except as in this ordinance provided shall canvass, solicit, distribute circulars, or other
matter, or call from house to house in the Town of Irvington without first having
reported to and received a written permit from the Chief of Police or the officer in
charge of Police Headquarters."
24. Id. at 162.
25. See note 16 supra.
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though the Court need not have reached that issue in the case. The
Irvington ordinance 26 was one where the right to distribute hand-bills
was left to the discretion of an administrative official. Even though the
ordinance was on its face a non-content ordinance, the right of discre-
tion makes such an ordinance different from those discussed above, in
that here the content may become relevant by the exercise of the dis-
cretionary power of the administrator. The problem raised by such
a statute is distinguishable from one where the standards for the grant-
ing of a license are clear." In the cases holding unconstitutional such
discretion over the granting of a license in the hands of an adminis-
trator, the Court has invalidated this discretionary power as a prior
restraint on the freedom sought to be exercised. 2' But, the fact that
the restraint comes prior or subsequent to the act is also not material
in these cases. In Cox v. Louisiana9 the appellants were arrested and
charged on two counts. One was the violation of a statute which pro-
hibited the obstruction of streets and sidewalks." This statute applied
subsequent, not prior, to the acts restricted. The Court recognized the
right of the state to regulate such behavior, but found that in fact
the police were allowed to discriminate in their arrests for violations
of the statute. Holding the statute unconstitutional as applied by the
police, the Court said
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to de-
termine which expressions of view will be permitted and which
will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons
or groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad
discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent of
such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad
prohibitory statute.3 1
This distinction then between restraints prior and subsequent in these
discretionary cases is also illusory.
A rule is therefore suggested for cases where the statute on its
face is one whose apparent purpose is not the suppression of a first
amendment right, but the protection of a local interest, regardless of
whether the restriction applies prior or subsequent to the act. Accord-
ingly, if the value to the state of the protection secured by the ordinance
26. See note 23 supra.
27. Where the statute or ordinance allows an administrator the right to discrimi-
natorily license, the statute can no longer be regarded as one whose purpose is to
safeguard the public's interest in order, clean streets or whatever. Therefore, the
purpose is no longer one which the state may use to regulate the exercise of first
amendment freedoms.
28. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
29. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
30. The state statute provided: "No person shall willfully obstruct the free,
convenient and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road,
or other passageway, or the entrance, corridor or passage of any public building,
structure, watercraft or ferry, by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining
traffic or passage thereon or therein." LA. Rtv. STAT. § 14:100.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962)
quoted in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 553.
31. Id. at 557. (Emphasis added.)
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is not enough to justify the restriction of first amendment rights then
the ordinance should be declared unconstitutional. If, however, the
ordinance passes this test, and the power is granted to an administrator
to regulate the content of speech through an arbitrary or discrimina-
tory exercise of his discretion so that in effect he may censor or punish
those who have ideas with which he does not agree, then the ordinance
must be invalidated. Even where there is a statute aimed at a legiti-
mate local interest, the power to restrict the exercise of a first amend-
men-t freedom must not depend on the content of the freedom to be
enjoyed. If a non-content ordinance passed both of these tests it should
be considered valid, with no reference to prior restraints at all.
In the third class of cases in which the prior restraint doctrine
has been argued, the statute has as its express purpose the restricting
of certain first amendment freedoms.3 ' Here the content is made rele-
vant, not by the vague powers granted, but by the express terms of
the restriction. In such cases the state must show either a clear and
present danger 33 or that the content of the speech is not protected by
the first amendment34 before the speech may be restrained or punished.
Again, the test for what is a permitted exercise of a first amend-
ment freedom should be the same whether the statute applies prior or
subsequent to the act.3 The majority of the statutes in these cases
have dealt with the censorship of obscenity in movies and books. Obvi-
ously the standard for what is obscene cannot vary depending on the
point in time when the restraint or punishment is imposed, and that
standard was in fact developed in cases where the statute applied subse-
quent to the act.3" In the latter obscenity cases it has been recognized
that labeling a statute a "prior restraint" does not automatically in-
validate it," and it has been demonstrated that the only true danger of
prior restraint arises in the absence of adequate procedural "safeguards
for confining the censor's action to judicially determined constitutional
32. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ; Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961);
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
33. In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949), the Court said: "That is
why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest." (Emphasis added.)
34. Obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
35. See note 3 supra.
36. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
37. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), where the
Court, confronted with the issue of whether a theater owner had the right to exhibit
his movies once without going through the censor board, decided that he did not have
such a right.
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court in Times Film was faced with
three alternatives: (1) to continue the prior restraint rule in its present form, that is,
that the mere form of prior restraint is unconstitutional when it may suppress pro-
tected speech; (2) to expand the exceptional cases; (3) to change from a form to a
substance test, that is, to uphold a statute which may in form appear to be an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint, but in substance provides sufficient safeguards against sup-
pression of expression to be constitutional. It has been suggested that the Court chose
the last alternative. See Note, 7 WAYN4 L. Riv. 589, 593 (1960-1961).
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limits .. ."3 The Court, therefore, has adopted certain procedural
requirements which make the procedural rights of one faced with a
censorship statute similar to those of one faced with a criminal punish-
ment taking effect after the act. If an analogy can be drawn from these
obscenity cases, it would seem that political speech could also be re-
stricted prior to publication if it was determined that it presented a
clear and present danger, so long as summary procedures for review
of the prior restraints are available.
In order to classify the nature of the prior restraint in the principal
Kovach case, the Senate Resolution must first be analyzed. It would
appear that the resolution was not drawn for the purpose of restraining
the content of the plaintiff's newspaper.39 Even though the Senate
members may have been motivated by the newspaper's objections to
their secret sessions, on its face the purpose of the resolution purported
to promote "a vital state interest."4 Obviously the case is not one
where the content is made specifically relevant by the language of the
statute; rather it is a case where the content is not relevant to the
application of the statute.
The court felt that the Senate could enforce their rules by the use
of a contempt proceeding punishing an offender for a failure to abide
by its rules.41 If this is so, then, according to the non-content cases
discussed above, the Senate ,should also have been allowed to require
those interested in being in the press section to agree to "abide by" the
rules of that body. However, as the court interpreted "abide by" to
mean more than merely not breaking the rules, the phrase "virtually
requires it [the newspaper] to surrender any opposition to Senate
rules."42 Under such a reading of the resolution the court found that
it goes "far beyond any reasonable measures required to protect the
Senate in the discharge of its duties or to preserve its dignity and
decorum. '4 3 If the Senate had tried the plaintiffs for contempt subse-
quent to the act for refusal to cease opposition to Senate rules, convic-
tion would be just as invalid as Senate Resolution No. 9, since it would
go far beyond reasonable measures to protect the Senate's decorum.
38. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965). See also Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963), where the court stated that the state must be
certain that the procedures used "will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally
protected expression."
Earlier Supreme Court cases indicated that procedure was not the only con-
cern in these cases. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952),
where the Court invalidated censorship of movies on the basis of their being sacri-
legious. The Court in its opinion emphasized the prior application of the statute;
however, it would seem that censoring a film on the basis of its being sacrilegious is
never a proper ground for the restriction of speech, be it prior or subsequent.
As to the nature of these procedural requirements, see Trans-Lux Distrib.
Corp. v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235 (1965), dis-
cussed in 26 MD. L. Rtv. 176 (1966).
39. The District Court stated the apparent purpose as protecting "the right of
a state legislative body to conduct its proceedings according to orderly procedures
free from interference or obstruction by non-members." 238 F. Supp. at 840.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 841.
42. Id. at 845.
43. Id. at 844.
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Therefore, the court's discussion of the distinction between prior
restraints and subsequent punishments was irrelevant. The court in-
terpreted the Senate Resolution to prohibit criticism by the newspaper
of rules with which it did not agree. But the court assumed that the
subsequent punishment available, that is, a contempt proceeding, would
punish not criticism but disruption of the Senate proceedings. Thus,
the court used different standards in deciding what the Senate could
constitutionally prohibit. In order to fairly compare prior restraints
and subsequent punishments, the court should have constructed a con-
tempt proceeding which would punish for criticizing the Senate rules.
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